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Are Nuclear and Nonnuclear War Related?
by
James J. Tritten
There is a tendency in the West to not take war too seriously; war being
the province of specialists far removed from the mainstream of public consciousness
Even among those who do take war seriously, we find a tendency to not consider
nuclear war as a very real prospect; hence it is often relegated to an even
smaller subset of sub-specialists. The purpose of this essay is to consider
the interrelationship between nuclear and nonnuclear war in light of the growing
complexity of combined arms operations and military campaigns that are likely to
occur in a future war. It is the author's contention that by failing to deal
with these intricacies, politico-military planning might be unavoidably and
erroneously bifurcated into separate nuclear and nonnuclear compartments resulting
in less than satisfactory execution of military operations in support of a war
or of its deterrence.
To bridge the gap between an academic exercise centered on deterrence, and
the use of military force to achieve political goals during a war, it is the
author's plan to begin by examining the issues from the perspective of likely
military actions that might occur during an actual nuclear war. This is largely
done to help the reader identify the more concrete relationships of nuclear and
nonnuclear warfare before moving into the world of pure theory. We also need
to separate ourselves from arguments that are used to support programming
requirements (the procurement of new military hardware) and those that are part
of our declaratory strategy (what we openly say that we will do) designed to
enhance the deterrence of war.
If a nuclear war were to break out, it could certainly be an unprecedented
global catastrophe with damage beyond anyone's most horrible visions. On the
other hand, it is entirely possible that a nuclear battle might occur in such a
manner that widespread global use does not occur, i.e., damage might be limited
to the immediate battlefield due to an early termination decision. There will
certainly be pressures to terminate any nuclear war at any_ cost in order to avoid
damage to the superpower's homelands, but there will likely be other pressures
to escalate vertically from the battlefield or to use one's central forces to
limit damage to one's own homeland. Damage limitation by preemptive strike is
the Soviet's openly declaratory strategy to fight a nuclear war.
Some of those who have tired to wrestle with the concept of nuclear war
fighting prefer to cnosider it as an irrational act devoid of political context,
unlikely, or not worthy of serious analysis. Witness arguments against certain
new weapons or capabilities - they might make nuclear war more likely, hence they
should not be developed. Similarly, some argue that there should not be any
serious discussion of nuclear war fighting since it might make it more likely.
Despite what nations have to say in order to deter other nations from
engaging in nuclear war, and despite what they must say in order to justify
programming decisions to their own publics and allies, nations do have a
responsibility to their citizens to thoroughly think through the concept of
nuclear war fighting so that they can better understand the dynamics of how
to deter it in the first place. Threatening to punish an aggressor by some
measure of damage to his society might sound reasonable to many in the West,
since that is likely what is sufficient to deter them from nuclear war, but
it is the Russian and how he views war and deterrence that is significant.
The Russians simply do not look at the world the same way that The West does.
The Soviet Union does take war and nuclear war quite seriously. Although
there does not appear to be any desire by them to initiate a nuclear war, or
even a general war with the West, from their own literature it can be clearly
demonstrated that if the Soviet Union were to be involved in a war (any kind)
with the West, their goal would be to "win" it or to at least ensure that the
West does not. In this case, I prefer to use "winning" as a concept that
remains undefined so that we can move on to consideration of what types of
actions can be expected if an opponent is attempting to fight a war with nuclear
weapons and terminate the hostilities on at least more favorable terms than his
enemy has. One can create from the Soviet literature a set of strategic golas
that, if implemented, are expected to lead to "victory." These include the
maintenance of Party control over the Soviet Union and extended empire, the
destruction of enemy nuclear forces before they can strike the USSR, and the
undermining of an enemy's military-economic potential.
If a nuclear war were to occur, military planners and commanders would
expect to execute orders designed to do something other than "lose" a war for
their country. These people may be somewhat removed from the political decision
makers who have to wrestle with the political, economic, social, and moral
character of "victory." The military's function in a future war is to make
recommendations about actions that are expected to achieve strategic goals and
thereby "win" the armed conflict portion of the war and to carry out the orders
to implement decisions reached by the political leadership.
Nuclear forces can and should be expected to be used directly against
enemy nuclear forces in a damage limitation mode. If one can destroy an enemy
missile or bomber that has a number of warheads on it before those warheads
detonate on one's own homeland, then this would appear to be the type of action
that a military planner or commander would probably actually recommend to his
political leadership in the event that a war were in progress.
In addition to direct attacks by nuclear forces against enemy nuclear forces,
we should expect that conventional forces would also be the subject of direct
attack by nuclear weapons during the nuclear phase of a war. If an attack on
command, control, communications, and intelligence facilities can be shown to
preclude the use of an enemy's nuclear forces to attack you, then we should
expect these forces to be high on the priority list for destruction in order to
limit damage to one's own homeland. If these conventional structures and
capabilities are heavily defended or located in areas making direct conventional
attack unlikely to succeed, then the nuclear option may be the only noe that
the military can feel it should recommend.
Similarly, if it could be shown that key logistical and support infra-
structures are vulnerable to nuclear strikes and that as a result of such
strikes, an enemy might be even more constrained in his attempt to reload and
threaten to reuse his nuclear forces, then it would seem logical that a
military planner would recognize this and recommend attacks on such facilities
to his political leadership. Not only could this directly limit future damage
to one's own homeland but it might also contribute to a more satisfactory war
termination climate and postwar balance of power. Simply put, if both super-
powers were to expend their entire nuclear arsenals but the Soviet union had
a unilateral advantage in that it could reload (even if it took months), then
the postwar world would probably be unacceptable to the U.S.
If the context of the nuclear phase of the war was that it escalated from
some conventional military action, such as rolling Soviet tank armies crossing
the inter-German border, then one should expect to see nuclear weapons used
directly against those enemy forces. Mobility of ground forces presents a
targeting problem but attacking key bottlenecks and known fixed support facilities
might be sufficient to complicate the Soviet's ability to manage an offensive in
Europe to the degree that they consider it unlikely that they could meet their
own prewar planning objectives on schedule.
Any national political leadership (such as the Politburo) that relies on
military force to retain control over its own country and extended empire should
expect those forces to be the subject of direct attack during any phase of a
war. If conventional capabilities appear to be incapable of successfully
attacking an enemy's military, then nuclear ordnance may the weapon of choice.
If the leadership itself is sufficiently protected from conventional attack, then
the use of nuclear weapons against them may be recommended in order to degrade
command and contrl to the extent possible. The Soviet's historical record for
"successful" war termination is to first defeat an enemy's army, then to destroy
his government, next to install a new government, and finally to negotiate war
termination with this new "friendly" regime. Why should we assume that the
Russians would break this pattern in a future war?
If a nuclear war were already in progress, there would certainly be some
that would recommend the use of nuclear weapons against conventional power
projection forces that might otherwise threaten one's self or allies in the
final stages of the war or during its aftermath. If an enemy's naval forces,
for example, were seen to be a thorn in the side of "progress" towards the
successful manipulation of one's own foreign policy objectives prior to the
war, the war may be seen as an opportunity to eliminate as many of those forces
as possible. Again, nuclear ordnance may be selected as the weapon of choice
if conventional capabilities are perceived as incapable of destroying the
target set.
When assessing the possible targets for nuclear weapons in an actual war,
the key considerations should be: the political objectives of the war; the
required military campaigns and actions that are necessary to achieve strategic
goals expected to attain these objectives; the time schedule by which one
hopes to mmet these goals; and the price that one is willing to pay in order
to achieve them. If it can be shown that attacks against an enemy's cities
are not likely to influence him to erminate the war on terms that are favorable
to you and thereby achieve any political objective of the war or strategic goal,
then there would be no military or political reason to do so. Neither super-
power embraces attacking enemy cities and both have made strides in increasing
accuracy and and decreasing yields that can be viewed as attempts to limit
collateral damage.
There are similar relationships between the employment of conventional
forces and nuclear weapons in the nuclear phase of a war. For example, non-
nuclear ballistic missile defenses (such as antiballistic missile systems,
mobility and hardening) can reduce the impact of an enemy's nuclear strikes.
Nonnuclear air defenses can degrade an onslaught of nuclear armed airbreathing
bombers and cruise missiles. A factor that is significant in calculating the
impact of such nonnuclear operations is that the authority to employ such
forces can be delegated down to rather lower levels of command, thus minimizing
the delays in receipt of an intelligence warning and the execution of a
response.
It is not necessary to await the nuclear phase of a war before attacking
an enemy's nuclear capabilities. In fact, this is exactly what the Soviets
openly tell us they intend to do. For example, storage casernes containing
nuclear weapons are probably high priority targets for Soviet destruction by
nonnuclear forces during the initial conventional phase of any war. Similarly,
the Soviets have told us that they intend to strike Western ballistic missile
submarines prior to their possible use or threatened use. The potential payoff
for the desctruction of an enemy ballistic or cruise missile submarine is quite
high in the number of warheads given that they could be destroyed by expending
only a few conventional weapons.
Destruction of enemy nuclear delivery vehicles during the conventional
pahse of a war contributes to the damage limitation goal, prevents their use
and reuse, and may so alter the correlation of forces that an enemy is thereby
deterred from escalation to nuclear war fighting. Attrition of dual-use forces
such as cruise missile carriers and tankers is likely during the conventional
phase of a war and will have an impact on the eprceived overall ability of a
nation to manage a subsequent nuclear phase of the war.
Unconventional nonnuclear forces should be expected to be employed to
degrade enemy intelligence and warning sites that support nuclear operations,
especially those located in remote and undefended positions. Direct attack by
more conventional forces would also aid the penetration of borders by air-
breathing nuclear forces. Nonnuclear attacks in space could have a decisive
impact on the ability to manage a nuclear or even a nonnuclear war.
A major factor in many of these actions that can be taken against enemy
nuclear forces in the conventional phase is time. Can sufficient actions be
taken quick enough to undermine an enemy's confidence in his ability to fight
at the nuclear level and thus cause him not to escalate in an undesirable
manner?
In addition to employing nonnuclear forces in either the conventional or
nuclear phases of a war to degrade the planned or current employment of enemy
nuclear forces, we should expect to see nonnuclear forces used to enhance the
performance of one's own nuclear forces attempting to carry out their missions
during either phase. For example, the bulk of the Soviet Navy is expected to
deploy in bastions where they will defend nuclear missile submarines from
attacks by Western antisubmarine warfare forces. This bastion defense could
simultaneously ensure that control is maintained voer one's own forces and
that the air defense envelope is extended against Western airbreathing nuclear
forces attempting to fly over the sea approaches to the USSR.
On the other hand, nuclear weapons can be used to directly enhance the
employment of nonnuclear forces engaged in more traditional forms of warfare.
For example, nuclear weapons might be used to open up channels for a conven-
tional force ground breakthrough. Nuclear "leakers" that survive naval battle
group air and antisubmarine defenses might cause sufficient damage so that
subsequent "mop-ups" by conventional forces would be easier to accomplish.
It should be clear from all these possible actions that could logically be
expected to be recommended during a war that nuclear and nonnuclear operations
could have a significant impact on each other. This drives the need for much
more sophisticated analysis of the nuclear balance well beyond the traditional
units of measure. Dynamic assessments are going to be required during a war so
that the proper recommendations can be made by the military to their political
leadership as the war progresses from one phase to another. If nuclear
operations end, do we expect either the armed struggle or the war itself to
also terminate? If we wait until a war breaks out to think all this through,
then the professional politico-military specialist has failed his country and
its citizens.
All parties to a war will attempt to measure the correlation of forces and
means during all stages of any future war. Decisions to engage in lateral
excursions, vertical escalation, or war termination will in part be influenced
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by the perceived existing and projected correlation of forces. The ability
to dominate the decision to escalate vertically, horizontally, in time, or
to another medium of warfare, is a significant political advantage that the
U.S. gave up in the 1960's. We must recognize that in actually fighting any
type of future war, the West may be unable to dominate the escalation decision
and thereby control escalation or war termination. More importantly, we cannot
allow actions taken once the armed conflict starts and during its conventional
phase that will place the Soviet Union into a positino where it can.
One of the paradoxes of our times is that we have generated a great amount
of views about deterrence theory but despite all the discussion, we must
recognize deterrence for what it is--a theory that cannot be objectively proven
as the reason that we have not fought a war with the Soviet Union. Furthermore
there is no agreed upon concrete formula that quantifies exactly what it is
that we must do to deter the Russians in the future. If there were, we would
know exactly what combination of offensive nuclear missiles, bombers, submarines,
and nonnuclear (or nuclear) defenses to build and deploy. When we attempt to
objectively determine the exact contribution of one weapon system or strategy to
deterrence, we proceed from an incomplete theory into an even softer and spongier
area. We constantly get ourselves confused with how much is enough in our own
minds instead of considering what will affect the minds of the Soviet leadership.
What is often more confusing is that the deterrence of war and of nuclear
war is not the only political objective of the United States. We openly state
that we will fight a nuclear war if the Soviet Union invades Europe and our
nonnuclear forces are unable to defend the alliance. Hence the ability to
live free and support key allies are apparently higher foreign policy objectives
than the deterrence of nuclear war. Even if deterrence of a nuclear war is
considered the primary goal by some (no matter what the cost), once a war
breaks out, other political objectives may be considered that also may be
more important than the continued deterrence of the nuclear phase of a war.
For example, many incorrectly argue that our current overall political
goal is stability. If that were true, then hegemony by one power should be an
acceptable mechanism for attaining stability and the reattainment of strategic
nuclear superiority before the war or during its initial conventional phase is
a logical strategy. In reality, our political objective is closer to stability
plus the maintenance of the existing international order, i.e., we do not
currently seek to overthrow the government of the Soviet Union. But if we
find ourselves in an armed struggle with the USSR (for reasons which strike at
the heart of our national survival or that of our allies), should we seek to
fundamentally overthrow the Soviet government? Would the Soviets try to do
this? Can either side use its miltiary forces to achieve that objective?
The point to all this is that there are some very subtle complexities that
well exceed the average military officer's appreciation of international politics,
These goals need to be clearly elucidated by the political leadership in a clear
top-down manner so that the military can then design the plans to execute
campaigns that will achieve these goals. This all needs to be done before the
war so that we can better hope to keep war or at least its nuclear phase deterred,
Given that each of the two superpowers concedes the possibility of an
extended conventional phase to a future war, thorough prewar planning must be
undertaken to not "blunder" into unwanted escalation (of any type) and nuclear
operations. The complex interactinos between conventional and nuclear forces
must be understood before nuclear phase begins so that opportunities for
deterrence or satisfactory war termination are maximized.
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There will be oeprations involving enemy nuclear forces that will be
"risky" during the initial conventional phase of a war. Yet according to our
Supreme Commander for Allied Forces in Europe, we are not prepared to fight an
extended conventional battle in defense of Europe, hence if vertical escalation
is likely anyway, then taking actions to alter the correlation of forces and
means might be worth the "risk." The destruction of nuclear assets, command,
communications, control, and intelligence facilities, etc., during the nonnuclear
phase of a war may so alter an enemy's perceptions, cost-benefit calculations,
and confidence in his ability to manage the nuclear campaign, that he chooses
not to escalate, or seeing that he cannot dominate the escalation decision, he
chooses not to fight in the first place.
Additional measures that can be taken during the conventional phase of a
war that may contribute to the deterrence of its nuclear phase are the posturing
of one's own nuclear forces to enhance survivability and the upgrading of
defensive measures to degrade an enemy's ability to successfully strike. For
example, the dispersal of bombers, mobile missiles, and the fleet from known
peacetime locations can send a message of political resolve and hopefully
result in fewer forces lost to a surprise first strike.
Quick-fix nonnuclear defensive measures might also be undertaken to alter
the correlation of nuclear forces. For example, dispersal of nuclear warheads
from casernes to unknown locations, moving ground forces out of the barracks,
naval forces out of home ports, emergency relocation of critical personnel and
supplies, and the rapid construction of temporary passive defenses could all
serve to alter the enemy's ability to achieve the expected levels of damage
against a variety of targets if he resorted to nuclear war fighting.
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Nations will have to be careful not to make their nuclear forces even more
vulnerable over time by using them to send political messages during the
conventional phase of a war. For example, will flexing the nuclear muscle
result in so much domestic pressure against escalation that the threat to
actually do so is perceived by one's opponent as empty? Will the dispersal of
nuclear forces to less capable bases result in significantly lower alert rates
after some period of time? Are dispersal bases more easily accessible to an
enemy's special warfare forces or attack by sabotage? Does flushing Soviet
submarines out of the bastions make them ore susceptible to attack by Western
antisubmarine forces? If so, are they likely to do it in the event of imminent
hostilities?
The types of military actions that should be taken during the initial conven-
tional phase of a war need not be 100% successful to enhance deterrence. The
objective should not be to search for "silver bullets" that can do it all but
to rather build a system of nuclear and nonnuclear offenses and defenses that
deny an aggressor the ability to calculate a successful use of military force
for political purposes. To do this, we need to understand what it is that a
likely opponent says he is going to do in the event of a war, what his forces
could do (based upon expert opinion), and how they train and exercise to fight.
If there is congruence, then we should feel justified in drawing conclusions.
By attempting to get inside the enemy's head and alter his perceptions, we
stand a better chance of deterring war. We should look at his perceptions so
that we can know how to best manipulate them to our advantage. The Soviet
Union clearly supports the combined arms method of war fighting and appears to
thoroughly understand the interrelationship of nuclear and nonnuclear offenses
and defenses in an overall system designed to use (if necessary) military
force to achieve definite political objectives. Our own appreciation of these
12
complexities can only help our ability to effectively manage the long-term
competitive relationship with the Soviet Union without resorting to open
armed conflict.
It appears from all of these factors that nuclear and nonnuclear warfare
are probably interwtined in ways that the average tactician or even strategist
may not normally fully appreciate. The tendency by some to separate armed
conflict into general warfare and nuclear warfare is an artificial one that can
lead to erroneous thinking and possible catastrophic errors during the execution
of military oeprations. Perhaps the most correct view of possible future
warfare between the superpowers is that any armed conflict between them is
automatically a nuclear war but one in which the nuclear weapons may not have
yet been used.
That being the case, we need to become extremely more sophisticated in our
construction of threat and net assessments. Simple minded tabulations of nuclear
force levels based on familiar arms control measures of effectiveness are not
only misleading but not a true measure of the strategic nuclear balance. We
msut move well beyond input measures that count "things" and perform complicated
dynamic assessments that include the interaction between offense and defense and
nuclear and nonnuclear forces over an extended period of time. "Spasm" exchange
calculations must give way to analyses of campaigns in which time as a crucial
variable is not overlooked. The correlation of forces and means is not a
static calculation but is a dynamic assessment that varies over time before,
during, and after the war.
A more correct way to assess a threat is to outline the objectives that
each nation hopes to achieve by its expected military campaigns, the time
required to do so, and the price that must be paid to meet those objectives on
schedule. In short, we must focus on output measures that by their very nature
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will not fit neatly onto briefing charts or the front pages of newspapers. New
measures of effectiveness will be difficult to explain to the public and the
political leadership of the nation but will serve to more fully represent reality.
This will put a heavy burden on the simulation and gaming communities.
The nature of nuclear war must be taken seriously and investigated as best
we can given the limitations of the social and hard sciences to predict. We no
longer live in a world where we can afford to say that there is nuclear warfare
and there is conventional warfare and we must not mix the two. The mixing will
go on despite everyone's best efforts to separate the two forms of warfare.
Keeping nuclear and nonnuclear warfare planning divorced in potential military
operations or in the programming process cannot be allowed to happen; otherwise
we risk having conventional operations that may adversely impact on the continued
deterrence of the nuclear phase of the war, or that fail to maximize on opportu-
nities to keep the nuclear threshold high. Similarly, the start of nuclear
operations in an armed conflict will not be the end of politics. Even if the
political aim becomes to terminate the war at any cost, someone has to think
through what combination of nuclear and nonnuclear operations whould be undertaken
to make this offer credible and to successfully execute it.
Arms control terms have been allowed to infiltrate military strategy to the
point where we are allowing the semantics to obfuscate objective conditions. For
example, the Soviet use of the term "strategic" to describe military weapons,
missions, goals, etc., does not equate to how the West uses the term to generally
refer to intercontinental nuclear. "Strategic" to a Russian may involve actions
by conventional forces in an adjacent theater that can result in the attainment
of strategic goals in that theater. The Russians have never accepted mutual
assured destruction as a theory of deterrence as witnessed by both their words
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and deeds. Their doctrine, strategy, nor force structure is indicative of a
nation that accepts leaving its population as hostage to an enemy's offensive
nuclear strikes.
Learning how the Russians think and calculate the correlation of forces and
means must be of the highest priority to our intelligence community. They will
then face the arduous task of explaining the Soviet perceptions to political and
military decision makers who will not be as aware of the differences and will be
tempted themselves to automatically "mirror image." If the Soviets appear to
be oriented toward output measures, dynamic assessments, and deterrence by
having a credible war fighting capability against aJJ enemies, then we must deal
with them on this level.
If the Russians who rule the Soviet empire appear to take seirously their
own military doctrine, then we need to get ourselves inside that process and learn
how to manipulate it to keep them from seeing any benefit in starting an armed
struggle. For example, if the Russian is paranoid and security conscious, does
not the maintenance of a bomber and cruise missile force help persuade the
Politburo to deploy and maintain very costly and manpower intensive air defense
forces that are unable to strike the U.S.? A combination of well thought out
force deployments, declaratory strategies, exercises to shape perceptions, and
arms control that is not sought as an end in itself, can all be combined to
influence the Soviet Union to commit their rubles in a manner that is less
threatening to the West and may keep the competition from breaking out into
open war.
The complex relationships between nuclear and nonnuclear warfare needs to
be more thoroughly investigated. An area that cries out for research is that
of the socialization of our key political-military decision makers; do they
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understand that the West can no longer dominate the escalation decision and
do they understand what this means in global crisis response? Do we expect the
Soviet Union to bargin with us from a position of strength or parity in a future
crisis? Do we recognize that extended deterrence extends over our naval forces?
The dynamics of war termination also need to be more fully investigated to
see what impact defenses could have on the successful termination of a war. What
combination of offense, defense, and conventional and nuclear forces appears to
have the best hope for deterring war in the first place but if deterrence were
to fail, for achieving the likely political goals that we anticipate if we ever
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